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Reflections on Joshua Dressler’s  
Understanding Criminal Law 
 
 
Peter Westen 
 
Joshua Dressler is without question and without rival America’s preeminent 
criminal law teacher.  His casebook and treatise are the principal portals through 
which American law students, including my own, understand criminal law, and 
both volumes fully deserve their preeminence. 
I first appreciated Josh’s influence when I began teaching criminal law in the 
late 1980s.  I was talking with a former student of mine and complimenting him on 
his final exam when he confided that he had learned from upper-class students that 
the key to succeeding in my class was to “read Dressler.”  I was surprised, I 
confess, because Josh’s Understanding Criminal Law1 had only recently appeared 
and was not yet on my radar.  I realized then, however, that I had to join those who 
“read Dressler,” if for no other reason than to keep abreast with what my 
students—or, at least, the best among them—were learning from him about 
criminal law. 
Understanding Criminal Law was neither the first American treatise on 
criminal law nor the most comprehensive.  But it soon dominated the field, at least 
among law students, because of its distinctive strengths.  Josh speaks to readers in 
a voice that is personal and humane, confining himself to issues that are of central 
interest to law students.  He expounds existing doctrine in simple, clear, and non-
dogmatic terms while also invoking the best of criminal law scholarship to analyze 
doctrine critically.  Where commentators disagree among themselves, he takes 
pains to present their contending claims impartially, including claims contrary to 
his own views.  He takes positions on some disputed issues of doctrine and theory, 
and yet reserves judgment on others.  Throughout, he imbues his exposition of 
doctrine and theory with felt compassion for victims and sympathy for alleged 
offenders. 
As my student implied, Josh and I tend to be like-minded about much of 
criminal law.  I shall pass over issues on which Josh and I have differed in the past 
because I have written about them elsewhere, including the elements of legality,2 
                                                                                                                                      
   Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, Emeritus, Michigan Law School. 
1   JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (1st ed. 1987). 
2   I have argued elsewhere that the principle of legality consists of two existing and well-
known moral norms: (1) No person should be punished absent a guilty mind, a norm that explains 
requirements of notice and prohibitions of retroactive criminal laws; and (2) No person should be 
punished absent high confidence that the community regards his conduct as punishable, a norm that 
explains the rule of lenity and prohibitions on desuetude—rules that, together, eliminate any need to 
void penal laws for vagueness.  Compare Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26 
LAW &  PHIL. 229, 229–30 (2006), with JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 39 (7th 
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the challenge of individualizing the reasonable person,3 the scope of transferred 
intent,4 impossibility attempts,5 and, perhaps most saliently, the reason that duress 
exculpates.6  I will focus on three other issues on which Josh takes positions in 
Understanding Criminal Law: (1) the subject matter of “Criminal Law;” (2) the 
meaning and usefulness of distinguishing between justification and excuse; and (3) 
the basic elements of criminal responsibility.  I select the three because, although 
they appear to be unrelated, they are all inflected by Josh’s view of the role in 
criminal law of harm. 
 
I. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Josh introduces Understanding Criminal Law and his casebook with what 
authors ought to address but only rarely do, namely, with the subject matter of 
criminal law.7  Most of the half-dozen casebooks consulted here make no attempt 
to discuss what distinguishes criminal law from other subjects in the curriculum,8 
and those that do provide little insight.  Thus, one casebook begs the question by 
                                                                                                                                                   
ed. 2015) [hereinafter DRESSLER] (arguing that the principle of legality consists essentially of a single 
norm against retroactive criminal lawmaking). 
3   I have argued elsewhere that the supposedly difficult problem of individualizing the 
reasonable person is easily resolved: one incorporates into the standard of reasonableness every 
physical and psychological trait the actor possesses, except his moral values, which one takes instead 
from what society rightly expects of persons.  Compare Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable 
Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 137 (2008), with DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 239 
(arguing that individualization “pose[es] difficult problems for the law.”). 
4   I have argued elsewhere that people’s shared intuitions regarding the justice of transferring 
an actor’s criminal intent from the victim whom he has in mind, say, A, to the victim whom he 
happens to harm, B, depend upon how the harm comes about.  Compare Peter Westen, The 
Significance of Transferred Intent, 7 CRIM. L. &  PHIL. 321, 321 (2013), with DRESSLER, supra note 2, 
at 124–26 (arguing that an actor be held liable for any harm to B that an actor intends to inflict on A 
and that, by virtue of his acting on his intent, falls upon B rather than A). 
5   I have argued that it can be both feasible and just to punish persons who commit pure legal 
impossibility attempts.  Compare Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 523 (2008), with DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 402–03 (arguing that it is neither feasible 
nor just to convict persons of attempt in pure legal impossibility cases). 
6   I have argued that the defense of duress is typically a justification, not an excuse.  Compare 
Peter Westen, Does Duress Justify or Excuse?, in MORAL PUZZLES AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES: ESSAYS 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY ALEXANDER (Heidi Hurd & Michael Moore, eds.) (Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming), and Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of 
Duress: A Justification, Not an Excuse—And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 835 (2003), 
with DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 301–04 (arguing that duress is an excuse). 
7   See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 1, 4; See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 1–6 (4th ed. 2007). 
8   See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 
(7th ed. 2001). 
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stating that its subject is “the body of law that declares what conduct is criminal”9 
without explaining what distinguishes “criminal” from non-criminal conduct.  
Another similarly begs the question by stating that the casebook’s “focus is on 
crime definition and the components of criminal liability,”10 also without 
explaining what distinguishes a crime from a tort.  Paul Robinson provides more 
insight by arguing that what distinguishes criminal law from other areas of law is 
that criminal law involves “moral condemnation.”11  Yet moral condemnation 
alone fails to distinguish criminal law from tort law, given that the use of punitive 
damages in torts also expresses moral condemnation. 
Josh improves upon Robinson’s account by imbedding it in a broader 
framework.  Yet Josh’s account raises issues of its own. 
 
A. Dressler’s Improved Definition of Criminal Law 
 
Josh introduces Understanding Criminal Law by addressing its subject matter.  
He states on page one that “[t]he study of the criminal law” is the study of two 
things: (1) “crimes,” and (2) “the principles of criminal responsibility for those 
crimes” (the latter, he says, being principles that determine when it is “fair” to 
blame persons for crimes).12 
Josh focuses most of his attention on the first component, i.e., “crimes.”  But 
in contrast to the way other casebooks frame criminal law’s subject matter, he also 
includes the second, i.e., principles of liability.  And he is right to do so.  For, 
regardless of what the state constitutes a crime as a matter of positive law, one can 
always ask of a person who commits a crime, “Is it morally just to blame him for 
it?”  By doing so, Josh is able to encompass something that students soon 
recognize as central to courses in criminal law, namely, the task of ascertaining 
whether and when persons who have done what the law declares to be criminal are 
morally blameworthy for it. 
With one minor exception, the “crime” component for Josh is a matter of 
positive law rather than morals.13  A crime, Josh says, consists of two elements, 
one of which involves the law’s view of an actor’s conduct, the other of which 
involves the state’s response to such conduct.  A person does not commit a crime, 
he says, unless the person violates what the law defines as a duty of the person to 
the “public” as a “whole” (as opposed to a duty to private persons alone) and, in 
thus violating a public duty, causes “social harm.”14  Even then, however, a person 
                                                                                                                                      
9   WAYNE LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1 (4th ed. 
2006) (emphasis added). 
10  RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
11  PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 1995). 
12  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 1, 4. 
13  The exception concerns whether it is a crime to possess mere thoughts.  See discussion 
infra Section IV. 
14  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 1. 
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does not commit a crime unless the state responds to his conduct in a distinctive 
way, namely, by punishing him for it.15 
Having defined crime as consisting in part of “punishment,” Josh focuses on 
defining punishment.  Interestingly, however, he defines punishment in two 
distinct ways that appear to be in tension with one another.  Thus, on the one hand, 
Josh relies on Henry Hart to argue that the essence of punishment is the moral 
condemnation that a conviction itself expresses, not any hardship that the state 
imposes on an actor as a consequence of conviction: 
 
“[T]he essence of punishment . . . lies in the criminal conviction itself,” 
rather than in the specific hardship imposed as a result of the conviction. 
. . .  What, then, essentially distinguishes the criminal law from its civil 
counterpart . . . is the societal condemnation and stigma that accompanies 
the conviction.  When the fact finder . . . determines that a person is 
guilty of a criminal offense, the resulting conviction is an expression of 
the community’s moral outrage, directed at the criminal actor, for her act. 
. . .  [A] crime might properly be defined as “an act or omission and its 
accompanying state of mind which, if duly shown to have take place, 
will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral 
condemnation of the community.”16 
 
On the other hand, Josh also relies on H.L.A. Hart and Kent Greenawalt to 
argue that the essence of punishment is not the conviction itself but hardship in the 
form of “pain” or other “suffer[ing]” that the state intentionally imposes on persons 
pursuant to a conviction: 
 
There is no universally accepted non-arbitrary definition of the term 
“punishment.”  Criminal law scholars have generally concluded, 
however, that D may be said to suffer “punishment” when, but only 
                                                                                                                                      
15  See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 1 (“A person convicted of a crime is punished”) (emphasis 
added). 
16  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 1–2 (first quoting George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and 
the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 193 (1953); and then quoting Henry Hart, 
Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958)).  Having defined what 
distinguishes criminal conduct from civil conduct, Josh says that the distinction “should” be observed 
even when it isn’t.  See id. I am not certain what Josh means by that, but I assume that he is referring 
to instances in which the state morally condemns persons for conduct that is not morally 
condemnable.  If so, Josh is mistaken in thinking that, in doing so, the state is disregarding the 
distinction between criminal and civil.  After all, Josh’s distinction defines “criminal” in terms of 
what the state does, e.g., morally condemn—not in terms of either what the state should do (e.g., 
morally condemn only those who deserve it) or what conduct deserves moral condemnation.  
Consequently, when the state morally condemns persons who do not deserve moral condemnation, 
the state is not disregarding the distinction between criminal and civil.  It is invoking the distinction 
to characterize as criminal what is criminal according to Josh but does not deserve to be so 
characterized. 
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when, an agent of the government, pursuant to authority granted to the 
agent by virtue of D’s criminal conviction, intentionally inflicts pain on 
D or otherwise causes D to suffer some consequence that is ordinarily 
considered to be unpleasant.17 
 
I will return to these two versions of punishment below.  It is worth noting, 
however, that whichever version applies, Josh’s definition of crime resolves the 
problem of punitive damages which Paul Robinson’s definition raises.  Robinson 
equates crime with moral condemnation, thereby making it difficult for Robinson 
to distinguish criminal proceedings from tort actions in which juries express moral 
disapproval by requiring civil defendants to pay punitive damages for violations of 
duties to private parties.  In contrast, Josh is able to distinguish private suits 
(including private suits resulting in punitive damages) from criminal proceedings 
by reserving the term “criminal” for violations of duties to the public as a whole.18 
 
B. Issues Raised by Dressler’s Definition 
 
Josh’s definition of crime raises interesting questions, including the role that 
“social harm” plays.  I will reserve discussion of social harm to part IV and focus 
here on (1) Josh’s seemingly inconsistent definitions of punishment, and (2) Josh’s 
assumption that moral condemnation should be confined to conduct that is mala in 
se. 
 
1. Inconsistent Definitions of Punishment 
 
As we have seen, Josh defines the punishment component of crime in 
inconsistent ways.  Thus, he initially writes that the essence of punishment is the 
moral condemnation that conviction by the state expresses; and yet, he later writes 
that its essence is the hardship that the state intentionally imposes on a person 
pursuant to authority granted by virtue of the person’s conviction.  If pressed, Josh 
might say that, rather than being viewed as mutually exclusive, the two definitions 
highlight different aspects of the social practice of punishing—one aspect of which 
is constitutive of punishment, the other of which is contingent to punishment.  If 
so, Josh could combine the two definitions to say: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
17  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 12 (first quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 4–5 (1968); and then quoting Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282–83 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002)). 
18  See generally Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The 
Past, the Present, and the Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392 (2008). 
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Punishment 
 
A person is punished if, and only if, the state convicts the person of 
violating a public duty by subjecting him to moral condemnation for the 
violation.  Moreover, a person is further punished if the state 
intentionally subjects him to hardship pursuant to authority granted by 
virtue of his conviction. 
 
The latter definition is an improvement.  Nevertheless, it contains two 
ambiguous terms, both of which originate in Josh’s definition of punishment as 
intentionally imposed hardship.  The first ambiguity is the term “intentional” 
(which Josh uses to describe the state’s motivation in subjecting a convicted person 
to hardship).  “Intentional” can be interpreted broadly to mean either purposely or 
knowing; or it can be interpreted narrowly to mean purposely alone.  If interpreted 
broadly, “intentional” results in a definition of punishment that is over-inclusive.  
To illustrate, consider Kansas v. Hendricks,19 which raised the question whether, 
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution, it was punishment for the state of Kansas to continue to confine 
convicts who had fully served their sentences for sexual violence based on proof 
that convicts suffered from mental abnormalities that rendered it likely that, if 
released, they would commit predatory acts of sexual violence in the future.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court held that such continued confinement does not constitute 
punishment because, even though Kansas may have known that such confinement 
is hardship, Kanas did not act for that purpose.  Kansas’ purpose was to protect the 
public, not to cause persons suffering or inflict hardship in the name of desert.20  
This suggests that, in the Court’s view, hardship does not constitute “punishment” 
unless the state’s purpose is that it be experienced as hardship. 
The second ambiguity is the phrase, “pursuant to authority granted by virtue 
of his conviction” (which Josh uses to describe the source of the state’s authority to 
impose hardship).  The phrase can be interpreted broadly to refer to hardship that 
the state imposes on an offender merely as a result of a conviction, and regardless 
of whether the state expressly deems him to deserve hardship by virtue of his 
conviction.  Alternatively, the phrase can be interpreted narrowly to refer to 
hardship that the state expressly deems an offender to deserve by virtue of his 
conviction.  Again, if Josh’s phrase is interpreted broadly, it produces a definition 
of punishment that is over-inclusive. 
To illustrate, consider by analogy the therapeutic practice of using aversive 
therapy in the form of administering mild electric shocks to autistic children to 
                                                                                                                                      
19  521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
20  Id. 
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disabuse them from engaging in destructive behaviors.21  In contrast to Hendricks, 
where hardship was not the state’s purpose, aversive therapists explicitly intend 
autism patients to experience hardship: aversive therapists intend the shocks to be 
uncomfortable so that autistic patients associate destructive behavior with 
discomfort and, as a result, eschew it.  What aversive therapists do not do, 
however, is clothe the shocks in expressions of moral condemnation.  They do not 
declare to autism patients, “You deserve this shock because you are a bad person 
who did a bad thing.” 
With the foregoing analogy to autism in mind, let us assume that a state 
decides to apply aversive therapy to persons who have been convicted of crimes.  
The state believes that aversive therapy will help persons who suffer from 
“Intermittent Explosive Disorder” (IED), a behavioral condition that, according to 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), causes 
victims to engage in explosive outbursts of violence that are disproportionate to the 
situation at hand.22  To do so, the state enacts a statute that applies to two classes of 
persons: persons who have been civilly committed for acts of violence for which 
they have been held not to be criminally responsible; and persons who have been 
convicted of acts of violence and whose sentences are about to expire.  The statute 
provides that both classes of persons can be subjected to continued confinement 
and subjected to aversive therapy if they are diagnosed as suffering from IED, 
provided that they are told that the shocks are being administered solely as therapy 
and not because the state believes they deserve shocks for culpable wrongdoing. 
The hardship suffered by the second class of persons (i.e., convicts who are 
subjected to aversive therapy following expiration of their criminal sentences) is 
objectively identical to the hardship suffered by the first class of persons (i.e., 
civilly-committed persons who have not been convicted).  And both hardships are 
objectively identical to the hardship that autistic children suffer.  To be sure, 
convicts are subjected to aversive therapy pursuant to their “conviction” (as 
opposed to pursuant to having been “civilly committed”).  However, by the time 
convicts are subjected to aversive therapy, their convictions for violence have been 
stripped of all that distinguishes their convictions from civil findings of violence 
by persons who are adjudged not to be criminally responsible, because both 
judicial adjudications are invoked as grounds for therapy rather than as hardship 
deserved by virtue of culpable wrongdoing.  It follows, therefore, that, if aversive 
therapy for civilly-committed persons is not punishment, aversive therapy for 
convicts who have fully served their sentences is not punishment either. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, a better definition of punishment is: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
21  See Amy Burkholder, Controversy over Shocking People with Autism, Behavioral 
Disorders, CBS NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/controversy-over-
shocking-people-with-autism-behavioral-disorders/ [https://perma.cc/FZ8S-GU78]. 
22  See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM-V) (5th ed. 2013). 
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Punishment-2 
 
A person is punished if, and only if, the state convicts the person of 
violating a public duty by subjecting him to moral condemnation for the 
violation.  Moreover, a person is further punished if the state purposely 
subjects him to hardship that it expressly deems him to deserve and 
imposes pursuant to authority granted by virtue of his conviction.23 
 
2. Confining Moral Condemnation to Mala in Se Conduct 
 
To repeat, Josh defines crime to consist in part of punishment, and he defines 
punishment to consist in whole or in part of moral condemnation by the state. 
Moral condemnation by the state is a public act of blaming by the state.  
Public blame by the state, in turn, is an expression by the state of the community’s 
moral indignation of an offender, the latter being the reactive emotion that a 
community feels toward those whom it feels engage in wrongful conduct in selfish 
disregard for the interests of others.24  Moral condemnation is just when it is 
directed toward those who deserve it.  But moral condemnation is unjust under two 
conditions: when it is directed toward persons who have not committed alleged 
wrongs; or when it is directed toward persons who have committed wrongs but 
who are morally blameless by virtue of not having done so in selfish disregard for 
the interests of others. 
Josh recognizes the injustices of blaming someone for a wrong he did not 
commit and/or blaming a person who, though he has committed a wrong, has done 
so blamelessly.25  However, in assessing whether conduct is wrongful, Josh makes 
an assumption that is questionable: he assumes that conduct is not wrongful—and, 
hence, not blameworthy—unless the conduct is immoral independently of its being 
prohibited in law.  As Josh puts it, conduct “does not justify moral condemnation” 
unless it is itself “morally wrongful behavior.”26 
I worry that Josh wrongfully conflates moral condemnation with 
condemnation of immoral conduct.  It is a fallacy to think that in order for moral 
condemnation to be just, it must be directed toward mala in se conduct, that is, 
conduct that is immoral prior to it being rendered criminal.  Conduct is morally 
condemnable when it infringes upon the legitimate interests of others.  Conduct 
that would not infringe upon the interests of others in a small, pre-urbanized, pre-
industrial society may rightly be deemed to infringe the interests of others in a 
                                                                                                                                      
23  See also Westen, supra note 2, at 244. 
24  See Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW & PHIL. 289, 353–71 (2006). 
25  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 3 (“‘[I]t is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that 
punishment entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may not justly be imposed where the 
person is not blameworthy.’”) (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A 
Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 10 (1980)). 
26  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 2 & n.9 (emphasis added). 
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complex, post-industrialized, regulatory state in which there is no other feasible 
way to address genuine risks to life and limb.  And because a complex, post-
industrialized, regulatory state can rightly prohibit such conduct, it can also rightly 
condemn persons who engage in it in selfish disregard of others. 
Consider a criminal statute that prohibits operating a motor vehicle on a 
public highway with more than a specified level of alcohol in the driver’s blood.  
To wield a life-threatening tool such as a sword or a modern automobile while 
dangerously impaired is a mala in se offense because it subjects persons to 
unnecessary risks of death.  Most automobile drivers who have more than, say, 
.01% alcohol in their blood are dangerously impaired.  But not all such drivers are 
dangerously impaired.  Some possess sufficient tolerance of alcohol that they are 
not dangers to others and, hence, are not guilty of mala in se conduct.  
Nevertheless, the law categorically prohibits all persons with a certain blood-
alcohol content from driving—and the law is right to do so under threat of 
condemnation—because of the cost, the risk of error, and the potential for police 
abuse in asking police officers to make individual assessments of dangerous 
impairment all make it inappropriate for the state to have to rely on such individual 
assessments of impairment.27  The state can legitimately deem all such driving to 
be an abridgement of the interests of others, and, because it can, it can morally 
condemn those who drive in selfish disregard of prohibitions against it. 
This is not to say that all malum prohibitum offenses are morally legitimate.  
Commentators differ regarding the conditions necessary for malum prohibitum 
offenses to be morally legitimate.28  The point is that some malum prohibitum 
offenses are morally legitimate, and because they are, it is morally appropriate to 
condemn persons who violate them. 
 
II. JUSTIFICATION VERSUS EXCUSE 
 
Wayne LaFave and Austin Scott, writing in their 1972 Handbook on Criminal 
Law, draw no conceptual distinction between justification and excuse.29  In 
contrast Josh distinguished between the two in his earliest writings,30 and he has 
continued to do so in his treatise. 
Josh emphasizes the distinction between justification and excuse because he 
believes it helps resolve difficult normative issues.31  I have questions about (A) 
                                                                                                                                      
27  R.A. Duff, Crime, Prohibition, and Punishment, 19 J. APPLIED PHIL. 97, 102 (2002). 
28  Compare id., with Douglas Husak, Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism, in DEFINING 
CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 65 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds. 
2005). 
29  See WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 356–413 
(1972). 
30  See Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in Criminal Law: A 
Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984). 
31  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 218. 
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the conceptual distinction that Josh draws between justification and excuse, and 
(B) the purposes that he believes the distinction serves. 
 
A. The Conceptual Distinction between Justification and Excuse 
 
 Josh starts by asking what the conceptual distinction between justification 
and excuse consists of.  Yet, as discussed below, he appears to define it in 
inconsistent ways.  He begins by saying that justification is a function of the 
exculpatory nature of acts, and that excuse is a function of the exculpatory features 
of persons.  Subsequently, however, he sides with commentators who argue that 
justification is a function of an actor’s mental state regarding his acts, not the 
objective nature of the acts themselves. 
Thus, Josh begins by defining the distinction as follows: 
 
Justified conduct is conduct that is “a good thing, or the right or sensible 
thing, or a permissible thing to do.”  That is, a justified act is an act that 
is right or, at least, not wrong . . .  [in contrast], [w]hereas a justification 
claim generally focuses upon an act (i.e., D’s conduct), and seeks to 
show that the result of the act was not wrongful, an excuse centers upon 
the actor (i.e., D), and tries to show that the actor is not morally culpable 
for his wrongful conduct.  Thus, an excuse defense “is in the nature of a 
claim that although the actor has harmed society, [he] should not be 
blamed or punished for causing that harm.”32 
 
This distinction between acts and persons is a familiar one because it is the 
distinction between bad acts (or “wrongdoing”) and guilty minds (or 
“culpability”).33  An actor does not commit the bad act of murder unless, as an 
objective matter and independently of his mental state, he actually causes the death 
of a human being.  And an actor does not have the guilty mind of murder unless, 
independently of the objective consequences of his actions, he concurrently has a 
certain subjective state of mind, e.g., malice aforethought.  This would suggest 
that, in Josh’s view, a justified act is an act that, as an objective matter, causes 
results that are permissible, all things considered, while an excused act is one that, 
though it causes objectively undesirable results, is committed by a person who, by 
virtue of his subjectivity, cannot justly be blamed for his actions.34 
That, however, is not Josh’s position.  On the contrary, Josh makes his 
position clear in the course of assessing a dispute over two contrasting views of 
justification.  One view reflects the aforementioned distinction between acts and 
                                                                                                                                      
32  Id. at 204–05 (citations omitted). 
33  Indeed, that is why it has been said that justification and excuse are nothing but the 
negations of bad acts and guilty minds, all things considered.  See Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and 
Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1561, 1563–65, 1572 (1999). 
34  See Westen, supra note 24, at 309–10. 
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persons: it is the view that, like bad acts, justification is measured ex post by the 
objective “deeds” that an actor actually commits (hereinafter the “deeds” view), 
regardless of what is in his mind.35  The other view, however, is quite different.  It 
is the view that justification is measured ex ante by an actor’s subjective “reasons” 
for acting based, reasons that are function of the information that is epistemically 
available to him (hereinafter the “reasons” view).36  The difference between the 
two views becomes significant in instances of reasonable mistake: an actor, A, 
makes a reasonable mistake, for example, when, based upon information available 
to him ex ante, he reasonably believes that B is about to wrongfully kill him, and, 
accordingly, he shoots and kills B—only to discover ex post that he was mistaken 
and that B was harmless.  Deeds- and reasons-theorists take contrasting positions 
on such reasonable mistake cases.  Both would both acquit A of murder, but they 
would do so for different reasons.  Reasons theorists would acquit A on the ground 
that, even though A actually killed a harmless person, he was justified because he 
acted reasonably based upon what he knew at the time.  In contrast, deeds theorists 
would acquit A on the ground that, although his deed of shooting a non-threatening 
person was objectively unjustified, A should be excused because he reasonably 
believed he was under threat. 
In the end, Josh appears to side with reasons theorists.37  Contrary to his 
earlier claim that the justification/excuse distinction tracks that between acts and 
persons, he concludes that justification is a function not of objective acts but of 
something peculiar to the person at issue, namely, what a person subjectively 
believes he is doing at the time he acts.  To support that conclusion, Josh asks 
readers to imagine a police officer who commits what would otherwise be a bad 
act (i.e., subjecting a person to involuntary confinement based upon his probable 
cause to believe that the person committed a crime—only to learn afterwards that 
the person was innocent all along).  Josh believes the police officer must be 
regarded as justified because the officer did what he was “legally entitled” to do.  
To take the deeds view, Josh says, is to take the untenable position that the officer 
“act[ed] outside the law,” where in reality the officer, being all too human, was 
merely mistaken.38 
Ultimately, this much remains clear: Justification can be determined ex ante.  
Or justification can be determined ex post.  But justification cannot be determined 
from both simultaneously.  One must choose between the two time-frames based 
                                                                                                                                      
35  For the “deeds” view, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 
100–24 (1997) (distinguishing ex ante from ex post views of justification as being the difference 
between “reasons” and “deeds,” and opting to embrace a “deed” view). 
36  For the “reasons” view, see Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and 
Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1903 (1984).  For Josh’s summary of the contrasting views, see 
DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 215–16. 
37  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 217. 
38  Id. 
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upon one’s position regarding of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
two views, including as they arise in instances of “unwitting  justification.”39 
The two time-frames each have advantages and disadvantages.  Determining 
justification ex ante has the advantage of using “justification” as an honorific term 
for persons who do their best based on such information as they possess ex ante.  
At the same time, however, the ex ante view has the disadvantage of not being able 
to account for whether harms have occurred that society wished to prevent, all 
things considered.  Consider two police officers, A and B, each of whom makes an 
arrest based upon probable cause, the difference being that A arrests a person who 
is guilty while B arrests a person who is innocent.  The law has reason to 
distinguish between A’s act and B’s act because B inflicts a harm that society 
wishes had not occurred: B inflicts a harm about which society—and, indeed, B 
himself—should feel what Bernard Williams calls “agent regret,” that is, regret not 
about B’s motivation in acting but about the grievous consequences of B’s action, 
even if the action was blameless.40  In contrast, neither society nor A should feel 
agent-relative regret about A’s act because the arrest he made was highly desirable.  
Yet the ex ante view has no way to distinguish between the respective 
consequences of A’s and B’s acts.  The ex ante view can do nothing but say to A 
and B alike, “Your actions were both justified.” 
The ex post view, too, has advantages and disadvantages.  It has the 
disadvantage of not being able to honor well-motivated behavior.  The ex post 
view cannot honor well-motivated behavior because it does not use “justification” 
to refer to motivations.  It uses “justification” in the same objective sense as the 
criminal law uses “bad act,” namely, to refer to objective harms, regardless of 
motivation: it uses “justification” to refer to harms that are not bad acts, all things 
considered, that is, they are not harms that society seeks to prevent or regrets, all 
things considered.  By the same token, however, the ex post view has the 
advantage of being able to distinguish between A and B by saying, “A’s action was 
justified, while B’s was not.” 
Josh and I have different preferences.  Josh prefers the ex ante view because it 
uses justification as an honorific, while I prefer the ex post view because it tracks 
the distinction between acts and persons.  I would be happy to leave it at that were 
                                                                                                                                      
39  An unwittingly justified actor is one who makes a reasonable mistake of the opposite kind: 
he maliciously harms a third person in the reasonable but mistaken belief that the latter is no 
wrongful threat to himself, only to discover afterwards that harming the latter was necessary to 
protect himself from imminent and wrongful harm at the latter’s hands.  Ex ante and ex post theorists 
agree that unwittingly justified actors are culpable but differ regarding what they should be punished 
for.  For penetrating discussion of the different ways that ex ante and ex post views treat unwittingly-
justified actors and those who resist them, see Robinson, supra note 35, at 108–15.  Although Josh 
does not address the issue, ex ante theorists generally argue that unwittingly-justified actors should be 
punished for completed crimes rather than attempt.  For the argument that they should be punished 
for attempt, see Peter Westen, Unwitting Justification, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming). 
40  BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973–1980, at 
20, 27 (1981). 
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it not for Josh’s arguments in support of the ex ante view.  Josh makes basically 
two arguments in support of his view.  He begins by saying that the law cannot 
expect persons to do more than make conscientious efforts to ascertain the facts, 
and that, when people do so, law should declare them justified, even if their actions 
produce unintended and undesirable harms: 
 
All that the law can fairly expect of a person is that she make a 
conscientious effort to determine the true state of affairs before acting.  If 
she does this, . . . her conduct is justifiable, although the result of her 
conduct . . . may be tragic.41 
 
With due respect, while the first sentence of Josh’s argument is incontestable, 
the second sentence begs the question.  Everyone agrees that the law cannot expect 
a person to do more than make a reasonable judgment based on the information he 
possesses ex ante.  Everyone also agrees that when a person does so and later turn 
out to be mistaken, he should be exculpated, despite committing a regrettable 
harm.  The question at issue, however, is how to characterize his rightful 
exculpation.  Advocates of the reasons view, who regard justification as an 
honorific, focus on the person’s ex ante motivation and, hence, characterize his 
conduct as justified.  Advocates of the deeds view, who focus on regrettable harms 
all things considered, characterize the person’s conduct as unjustified.  Each view 
has its advantages and disadvantages.  But it is not an argument in favor of the 
reasons view to say, as Josh does, that if an actor is well-motivated, her conduct is 
justified.  Saying so is simply a restatement of the reasons view. 
Josh also argues that the ex post view is unfair to persons who do their best 
based on the information they possess ex ante.  Consider, he says, the previously-
mentioned police officer who makes an arrest based on probable cause only to 
discover afterwards that the arrestee was innocent.  To adopt the ex post view, Josh 
says, is to say that the police officer “act[s] outside the law.”42  I beg to differ.  To 
act “outside the law” is to exclude oneself from the protections of the law.  The ex 
post view does not exclude the police officer from the protections of the law.  It 
does precisely the opposite: it declares that, although the police officer committed 
an act that produced regrettable results (and, hence, was unjustified), he is entitled 
to the protection of the law in that by virtue of his appropriate motivation, he has a 
right to be adjudged to have been blameless. 
To be sure, the ex post view conceptualizes the officer’s impunity in terms of 
excuse.  But excuse under the ex post view has none of the pejorative connotations 
that it possesses under the ex ante view.  Indeed, if anything, excuse has positively 
laudatory connotations under the ex post view.  Of course, under ex ante and ex 
post views alike, a person is excused only if he is first determined or assumed to 
                                                                                                                                      
41  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 217. 
42  Id. 
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have acted unjustifiably.43  However, lack of “justification” has different meanings 
under the two views and, hence, “excuse” has different meanings as well.  Under 
the ex ante view, to act justifiably is to act with proper motivation, and to act 
unjustifiably is to act with motivation that is flawed in some way (e.g., because of 
insanity, immaturity, or involuntary intoxication).  Consequently, to be excused 
under the ex ante view is to be exculpated, despite a certain deficit in cognition or 
volition.  In contrast, to act unjustifiably under the ex post view is to do nothing 
but produce undesirable results, regardless of one’s motivation.  Accordingly, 
under the ex post view, to be excused is to be exculpated on any ground that 
renders one blameless, including acting with the kind of reasonable, good-faith 
motivation that renders a person justified under the ex ante view.  Thus, to excuse 
a police officer under the ex post view is not to begrudgingly exculpate him despite 
a cognitive or volitional deficit.  It is to exculpate him on the ground that, though 
he brought about a harm that everyone including himself regrets, his motivation 
was entirely virtuous. 
 
B. The Purposes Served By the Justification/Excuse Distinction 
 
Josh argues that the justification/excuse distinction serves six distinct 
purposes.  Two of the alleged purposes are, indeed, valid, and they are valid 
regardless of whether one embraces an ex ante or ex post view of justification.  
Three of the alleged purposes are questionable, however, and one is superfluous. 
 
1. Valid Purposes for the Distinction 
 
Josh rightly argues that the justification/excuse distinction serves two valid 
purposes: (a) the distinction identifies conduct that is and is not justified, and, in 
doing so, it instructs people regarding how they should and should not act; and (b) 
the distinction also identifies conduct that is and is not excused, and because 
persons who engage in unjustified conduct in the expectation of being excused 
have no moral right to be exculpated, the distinction identifies defenses (i.e., 
excuses) that can be repealed retroactively without thereby abridging anyone’s 
moral rights.44 
Significantly, the distinction serves those two purposes, regardless of whether 
it is based upon ex ante or ex post views.  Thus, with respect to instructing people 
regarding what they may and may not do, the ex post view of justification tells 
people which harms are objectively non-regrettable, all things considered, and, 
hence, it tells people what results to aim toward, even though they cannot know 
until afterwards if they have succeeded.  Similarly, the ex ante view tells people 
they may act on the reasonable belief that they are not committing regrettable 
                                                                                                                                      
43  See Marcia Baron, Is Justification (Somehow) Prior to Excuse?  A Reply to Douglas Husak, 
24 LAW & PHIL. 595, 602 (2005). 
44  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 218, 220. 
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harms, all things considered, and, hence, it tells them what beliefs to act on, though 
they cannot know until afterwards if their beliefs were accurate. 
With respect to retroactive repeals, ex post and ex ante views define what 
results and beliefs are permitted, all things considered, and they both establish 
residual categories of exculpatory defenses that have nothing to do with 
permissible conduct, i.e., excuses.  Because excuses under both have nothing to do 
with permissible conduct, repeals of excuses under both may be made retroactive 
without abridging anyone’s moral rights (provided, of course, that such repeals 
could also be made prospective without abridging their moral rights).  To be sure, 
the ex post view of justification treats as an excuse something that the ex ante view 
treats as a justification, namely, an actor’s reasonable but mistaken belief that force 
is necessary to avert imminent and proportional harm.  And the latter defense is 
one that it would, indeed, be morally unjust to repeal retroactively.  Notice, 
however, why it would be unjust to repeal the defense retroactively.  Retroactive 
repeal would be unjust not because it is retroactive but because it is a repeal.  
Repeal of any kind would be morally unjust, even if it were made prospective.  
Repeal would itself be morally unjust because, regardless of whether reasonable 
belief in the necessity of proportional force to avert imminent harm is 
characterized as a justification or an excuse, no one should be punished who 
reasonably believes that force is necessary and proportional to avert imminent 
harm. 
 
2. Dubiously Valid Purposes for the Distinction 
 
Josh argues that the justification/excuse distinction serves three additional 
purposes: (a) identifying when third parties may intervene on behalf of putative 
victims, (b) helping legislatures avoid the inconsistency of combining partial 
justifications and partial excuses, and (c) identifying when defendants may be 
made to bear burdens of persuasion.  I do not believe that either the ex ante or ex 
post views of justification support the first two purposes, and doubt that the ex ante 
view supports the third. 
 
i. Identifying When Third Persons May Intervene on Behalf of Putative 
Victims 
 
Josh argues that the justification/excuse distinction is useful because, if a 
person, A, is justified in using force against another, B, it means that a third person, 
C, would also be justified in using force against B as well.45 
I am skeptical that the justifiability of C’s conduct invariably derives from the 
justifiability of A’s or B’s conduct.  Consider two persons, A and B, each of whom 
is justified in using lethal force against the other under Josh’s ex ante view: A 
reasonably but mistakenly believes that B is about to wrongfully shoot him and, 
                                                                                                                                      
45  Id. at 219–20. 
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hence, prepares to use lethal force to protect himself; B observes A’s threatening 
behavior and reasonably and accurately believes that A is about to shoot him.  If 
Josh is right that justification is defined ex ante, and if he is right that a third 
person is entitled to use whatever force another person is justified in using, it 
means that a third person, C, who has no personal relationship to either A or B and 
who is fully aware of the facts, is justified in shooting B.  But is that true?  Is C 
justified in killing B whom C knows was no threat at all to A until A erroneously 
mistook him for a threat and prepared to kill him?46 
In rejoinder, ex post advocates would say that, rather than supporting Josh’s 
assumption that third parties are justified in doing what others are justified in 
doing, the foregoing hypothetical does something else: it vindicates the ex post 
view over the ex ante view because under the ex post view, A is not justified in 
using force, thereby explaining widely-held intuitions that C would not be justified 
in aiding him.  To eliminate that rejoinder, therefore, consider instead a case that 
ex ante and ex post views treat identically.  Consider Robert Nozick’s ‘falling fat 
man’ hypothetical.47  In Nozick’s hypothetical, a malicious villain pushes a fat 
man, A, into a well, intending to kill him; A, who will otherwise die from the fall, 
happens to find himself falling toward B who is lying at the bottom of the well and 
whose body will save A by acting as a cushion, albeit at the cost of B’s life; B has a 
ray-gun and can protect himself from being fatally crushed by A’s falling body but 
only if he vaporizes A.  Nozick argued that B is justified in killing A to prevent A 
from lethally crushing him. 48  (Otherwise, the law’s message to B is, “Despite your 
innocence, you should let yourself be fallen upon and killed”).  Now assume that A 
also has a ray-gun and can vaporize B before B succeeds in vaporizing him.  If 
Nozick is right that B is justified in killing A to prevent A from killing him, isn’t A 
also justified in killing B in order to prevent B from killing him?  Do A and B not 
each have agent-relative interests in favoring himself over the other, given that 
both are innocent and each must kill or be killed?49  (Otherwise, the law’s message 
to A is, “We would rather B kill you than you kill B, despite your both being 
innocent”). 
With that mind, consider a third-party stranger, C, who has no personal 
relationship to either A or B but has a ray-gun of his own.  Regardless of whether 
                                                                                                                                      
46  The MPC, which otherwise adopts the ex ante view of justification, avoids ruling that C is 
justified, but the MPC does so only by engaging in “gyrations” that enable it to mimic the results of 
the ex post view.  See Robinson, supra note 35, at 107. 
47  ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34–35 (1974). 
48  Id.; accord SUSAN UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENCE JUSTIFICATION OF 
HOMICIDE 177 (1994); Helen Frowe, Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 
277, 277–78 (2008); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 286 (1991).  But 
see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Justifying Self-Defense, 24 LAW & PHIL. 711, 734 (2005). 
49  See authorities cited in supra note 48.  For the claim that agents have agent-relative 
interests to inflict harm that agent-neutral persons do not, see THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM 
NOWHERE 164–66 (1986); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 27 (1984); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, 
THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 41–114 (1982). 
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one adopts an ex ante or ex post view of justification, one who believes that the 
justifiability of C’s conduct is derivative of A’s or B’s would have to maintain that, 
because A and B are each justified in vaporizing the other, C is justified in 
vaporizing either A or B, whichever he chooses.  But is that true?  Is it true that C, 
who has no stake in the outcome, is justified in vaporizing whichever of the two he 
chooses merely because A and B (who do have personal stakes in the outcome) are 
each justified in vaporizing the other?50 
 
ii. Helping Legislatures Avoid Combining Partial Justifications and 
Partial Excuses 
 
Josh argues that the justification/excuse distinction also helps prevents 
legislatures from creating “inconsistent,” even “contradictory” defenses by 
inadvertently combining partial justifications with partial excuses within a single 
defense.51 
To illustrate, Josh points to the partial defense of reasonable heat-of-passion, a 
defense which reduces the grade of criminal homicide from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter.  Josh argues that the partial defense of reasonable heat-of-passion 
“suffers from a lack of proper attention to the justification/excuse distinction” 
because some of its elements “are best explained in justificatory terms, while 
others seem excused-based.”52 
I might say in passing that I differ with Josh’s description of the reasonable 
heat-of-passion defense.  I do not believe that any elements of the defense are best 
explained in terms of justification.  As Josh himself explains later in his treatise,53 
                                                                                                                                      
50  See Jonathan Quong, Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 815, 
817 (2016) (arguing that the answer is no). 
To be sure, Josh might argue that A and B do, indeed, have a defense that C lacks, but that it is 
a defense of excuse, not justification.  Specifically, Josh might argue that A and B have a defense of 
duress under MPC § 2.09(1)—a defense that Josh regards as an excuse—because persons of 
“reasonable firmness” in A and B’s situation in contrast to persons in C’s situation would have been 
“unable to resist” the threats they faced.  See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 301–04.  This claim raises 
two problems.  First, MPC § 2.09(1) confines the defense of duress to persons who are victims of 
“coerci[ve]” threats, and neither the threat to A nor the threat to B is coercive.  Second, and more 
importantly, the “reasonableness” of an actor’s firmness is measured not by that of an average person 
but by that of by that of a right-minded person.  See R.A. Duff, Rethinking Justifications, 39 TULSA 
L. REV. 829, 840 & n.32 (2004); R.A. Duff, Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings, in CRIMINAL LAW 
THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 47, 64–66 (Stephen Shute and A.P. Simester eds. 2002); 
John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 579 (1998).  Consequently, if 
reasonable persons in A and B’s situation in contrast to C’s situations would have been unable to 
resist, it is precisely because A and B had legitimate agent-relative interests that C lacked, interests 
that go to justification, not excuse.  See Gary Watson, Excusing Addiction, 18 LAW & PHIL. 589, 608–
10 (1999) (agent-relative interests go to justification, not excuse). 
51  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 218. 
52  Id. at 218. 
53  Id. at 539–40. 
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the defense can be wholly accounted for without assuming that provoked persons 
are even partially justified in killing: the defense exists not because reasonably 
provoked persons are even partially justified in killing, but because they are 
justified in being very angry, and because the emotion of anger makes it difficult 
(though not impossible) for persons to act in accord with their settled values.54 
Nevertheless, even if Josh were right that some elements of reasonable heat-
of-passion sound in justification and others in excuse, it does not follow that it is 
wrong to combine them.  A partial justification, when valid, reduces the degree of 
an actor’s culpability.  A partial excuse, when valid, also reduces the degree of an 
actor’s culpability.  An actor’s possession of both defenses is cumulative and 
reduces culpability more than either standing alone.  To illustrate, consider the 
Model Penal Code’s provision on death-penalty sentencing.  The MPC specifies 
certain mitigating circumstances that reduce a capital defendant’s punishment from 
death to imprisonment unless the trier of fact finds that none of the enumerated or 
other mitigating circumstances is “sufficiently substantial” to call for leniency.55  
Significantly, at least two of the enumerated mitigating circumstances consist of 
partial justifications, and another three consist of partial excuses (as marked below 
in brackets): 
 
MPC section 210.6(4) Mitigating Circumstances 
 
*  *  * 
 
(b)  [Partial excuse]  The murder was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
 
(c)  [Partial justification]  The victim … consented to the homicidal act. 
 
(d) [Partial justification] The murder was committed under circumstances 
which the defendant believed to provide a moral justification or 
extenuation for his conduct. 
 
*  *  * 
 
(g)  [Partial excuse]  At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality… of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of 
mental disease or defect or intoxication. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
54  See Peter Westen, How Not to Argue that Reasonable Provocation Is an Excuse, 43 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 175 (2009). 
55  MODEL PENAL CODE  § 210.6(2) (repealed 2009). 
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(h) [Partial excuse]  The youth of the defendant at the time of crime.56 
 
Now suppose an actor murders someone while possessing multiple mitigating 
factors, some of which sound in partial justification and others of which sound in 
partial excuse.  Thus, imagine an actor who, at the request of a loved one who 
suffers from a terminable and painful disease, and upon feeling extremely 
emotional as a result, administers the loved one lethal drugs with the latter’s 
consent.  Or imagine that a seventeen year-old actor shoots and kills a robber who 
is fleeing in his stolen car, believing that he is justified in doing so to recapture his 
car.  And imagine that both actors are charged with capital murder.  Is it really 
“inconsistent” or “contradictory,” as Josh suggests it is,57 for jurors—or for 
legislatures, for that matter—to conclude that such partial defenses can be  
combined and that, when they are combined, they possess greater mitigating force 
than any one standing alone? 
 
iii. Identifying Defenses on Which Defendants May Be Made to Bear 
Burdens of Persuasion 
 
Josh further argues that the justification/excuse distinction helps identify 
defenses on which the state must bear burdens of persuasion, i.e., justifications, 
and defenses on which defendants may be made to bear burdens of persuasion, i.e., 
excuses.58 
I have doubts, at least under the ex ante view of justification that Josh 
embraces.  People disagree regarding which factors rightly bear on burdens of 
persuasion.  However, if Josh is right that the state ought to bear the burden of 
persuasion regarding ex ante justification, it is hard to see why the state should not 
do the same regarding some defenses that are excuses under the ex ante view.  To 
illustrate, contrast two actors, A and B, each of whom is charged with murder for 
shooting and killing a housemate; each claims in his defense that he shot his 
respective housemate in the actual and, for him reasonable belief that doing so was 
necessary to prevent the respective housemate from imminently and wrongly 
killing him first; and each realizes by the time of trial that he was mistaken in 
thinking his life was in danger.  The difference is that actor A is a sane person, 
while actor B is a certifiably paranoid/schizophrenic. 
As we have seen, Josh takes the position that reasonable belief by a sane 
person in the necessity of self-defense is a justification, even when the belief is 
mistaken.  Josh further argues that because such belief is a justification, the state 
has the burden of disproving two things: (i) that A actually believed that lethal self-
defense was necessary to protect him from imminent, wrongful and grievous harm; 
and (ii) that it was reasonable for A to have that belief.  At the same time, however, 
                                                                                                                                      
56  Id. at § 210.6(4) (repealed 2009). 
57  See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 218. 
58  See id. at 220–21. 
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Josh takes the position that a mistaken belief by an insane that he must kill to 
protect himself from wrongful attack is an excuse and, hence, something on which 
the defendant bears the burden of persuasion at trial.  One must wonder, however, 
whether the state should not also bear the burden of disproving B’s defense.  After 
all, the issues in dispute at A and B’s trials are the same: did the defendant actually 
believe that he had to kill to prevent himself from being imminently and wrongly 
killed? And (ii) if so, was the defendant blameless for possessing and acting on 
that belief? 
 
3. A Superfluous Purpose for the Distinction 
 
Josh argues that the justification/excuse distinction also identifies when third-
persons may act as accomplices in assisting actors in using force against others, 
namely, when those whom the third persons would assist are themselves justified 
in using force.59 
I have previously expressed doubts about whether Josh is right to claim that 
the right of third persons to intervene on behalf of putative victims is a function of 
justification.60  Even if Josh is right about that, however, his argument regarding 
accomplices seems superfluous because the right of third parties to intervene in 
place of putative victims surely includes the lesser right to assist them. 
 
III. BASIC ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
A major strength of Josh as a treatise writer is his intuitive affinity for 
conventional understandings of criminal law.  He generally avoids fanciful or 
unorthodox theories by keeping his authorial finger on the pulse of mainstream 
thinking. 
Josh’s discussion of basic elements of criminal responsibility is illustrative.  
Treatise writers customarily conceptualize criminal responsibility as consisting of 
bad acts and guilty minds, and they define bad acts as consisting of actions or 
omissions that are harmful, offensive or dangerous.  Following in that path, Josh 
argues that actus reus is the “physical or external part” of a crime and consists of a 
voluntary act or an omission that causes “social harm”61—social harm being 
something that violates or endangers the legitimate interests of persons or the 
state.62  The scope of an actor’s debt to society—and, hence, of the punishment an 
                                                                                                                                      
59  Id. at 219. 
60  See supra section II.B.2.i. 
61  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 85 & n.4, 114, 181, 203. 
62  Id. at 113–14.  Mens rea, in turn, according to Josh, is the “internal portion” of crime, 
involving an actor’s “moral blameworthiness” and consisting of an actor’s “culpable state of mind.”  
Id. at 52–53, 114. 
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actor deserves—is directly a function of the social harm he causes, whether it 
consists of an injury he causes or a danger he creates.63 
I sympathize with Josh’s instinct to adhere to convention.  However, I believe 
his view is mistaken in two respects: the actus reus component of crime need not 
itself cause social harm; and punishment that a wrongdoer deserves is not a 
function of the social harm he causes. 
 
A. The Relation between Actus Reus and Social Harm 
 
Josh is right that actus reus components often consist of acts or omissions that 
cause harm in the form of injury or danger.  Thus, the actus reus of homicide 
consists of causing the death of a human being, and the actus reus of reckless 
endangerment consists of endangering another’s life or physical well-being.  
However, it is not true that actus reus components always consist of acts or 
omissions that cause harm.  Some actus reus components are entirely innocuous. 
To illustrate, suppose that an actor, A, is charged with attempted sale of a 
controlled substance based on evidence that he sold powdered sugar to a DEA 
agent in the mistaken belief that it was cocaine.  Or suppose that an actor, B, is 
charged with possessing tools that could be used to commit burglary with intent to 
commit a non-consensual entry.  The “physical or external” acts that A and B are 
alleged to have committed—that is, the actus reus of their respective crimes—are 
innocuous: A’s alleged act consists of his selling powdered sugar; B’s alleged act 
consists of possessing tools that lend themselves to consensual and nonconsensual 
entries alike.  Neither act is injurious or dangerous in itself: grocery stores 
everywhere sell powdered sugar; and locksmiths everywhere possess tools that can 
be used for non-consensual entry. 
This is not to deny that A and B have revealed themselves to be dangerous.  
They did present dangers.  But the dangers they presented—the social harms they 
caused—did not consist of their “physical or external” acts alone.  The dangers 
they presented arose not from the actus reus that each committed, but from the 
combination of actus reus that each committed and the mens rea with which they 
committed them. 
 
B. The Relation between Harm and Deserved Punishment 
 
Commentators disagree about the relationship between the harms that 
culpable actors cause and the punishments they deserve.  Some commentators, 
whom Josh calls “culpability-retributivists,” argue that deserved punishment is a 
function of the wrongful harms that actors manifest themselves willing to inflict, 
not harms that may subsequently transpire after actors have performed all that is 
within their control.64  Others, whom Josh calls “harm-retributivists,” argue that 
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deserved punishment is a function in part of the wrongful harms that culpable 
actors actually bring about, even where such resulting harms are not wholly within 
their control.65 
Josh ultimately sides with harm-retributivists.  He believes that the amount of 
harm that proximately results from an actor’s culpable conduct—regardless of 
whether the harm is “physical, psychological, moral, [or] economic, etc., to the 
immediate victim, the victim’s family, and the broader community”—determines 
the actor’s retributive desert:66 
 
The principle of causation is the instrument society employs to ensure 
that criminal responsibility is personal. . . .  “[C]ausation” serves as the 
mechanism for determining how much the wrongdoer owes society and 
ought to repay it, i.e., causation principles help quantify his just deserts.67 
 
To illustrate, assume that actors, A and B, both shoot persons in the head with 
intent to kill with differing results: A’s victim dies, while B’s victim miraculously 
survives.  Josh argues that, while A and B both produce social harm, A produces 
the greater harm—A actually brings about the death of his intended victim—and, 
hence, A owes greater debt to society repayable through greater punishment: 
 
[T]he criminally successful actor and the unsuccessful one “have done 
different things” . . . .  Since the harm caused by a failed attempt is less 
than that caused by the successful commission of the targeted crime, the 
debt owed by the attempter is less than that of the successful 
wrongdoer.”68 
 
Josh’s view has the advantage of conforming to the common practice of 
generally punishing completed offenses more severely than otherwise identical 
impossibility attempts.  Nevertheless, Josh’s view presents at least two problems.  
First, it decouples desert from blameworthiness.  According to Josh, 
blameworthiness is a function of an actor’s mental state and willingness to act on 
it.69  By that measure, murderer A and attempted murderer B are equally 
blameworthy because they possess identical criminal intent and identical 
willingness to act on it.  Yet, even though A and B are equal in blameworthiness, 
Josh deems them unequal in desert. 
Second, Josh’s view makes it difficult to justify the common practice of 
punishing some inchoate crimes equally with otherwise identical crimes of harm.  
Consider the MPC, which punishes most impossibility attempts equally with 
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66  Id. at 52–53. 
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68  Id. at 386 (citation omitted). 
69  See id. at 386 (distinguishing “culpability” and “fault” from “harm”). 
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otherwise identical completed crimes.70  Or consider jurisdictions that punish 
larcenies equally, regardless of whether deprivations of property are temporary or 
permanent.71  For harm-retributivists, there is no deontological justification for 
punishing such offenses equally.  Either some offenders are punished more 
severely than they deserve or others are punished less severely than they deserve. 
Significantly, there is a deontological account of desert that equates it with 
culpability and, yet, is also consistent both with jurisdictions that punish completed 
offenses more severely than inchoate offenses and with jurisdictions that punish 
completed and inchoate offenses equally.  It is Plato’s account of the relationship 
between resulting harms and criminal desert.72  Plato was a culpability-retributivist 
who believed that criminal desert is a function of the wrongful harms that an actor 
manifests himself willing to bring about and not harms that may thereafter occur.  
Thus, with respect to two malefactors who both throw spears intending to kill their 
respective enemies, Plato argues that the two are equally guilty and equally 
deserving of punishment, even though one malefactor’s spear finds its intended 
victim and the other fortuitously misses. 
Nevertheless, Plato says, it does not follow that desert-minded societies are 
obliged to punish the two malefactors equally.  It does not follow because 
punishments also have an expressive function, including the backward-looking 
function of expressing how societies feel about what actors have done.  Societies 
may rightly feel relieved when, because of sheer luck on society’s part (rather than 
lack of effort on a malefactor’s part), a malefactor fails to inflict a harm that he 
does all he can to inflict.  And societies can rightly express that relief by punishing 
failed impossibility attempts less severely than successful attempts, not because 
they feel failed attempters deserve less punishment, but because, being relieved at 
their good fortune, they can rightly acknowledge feeling less distressed than if the 
attempts had succeeded.  In contrast, societies that use punishment to express 
desert alone rather than relief when attempts fail can do so by punishing successful 
and failed attempts equally. 
 
IV. SOCIAL HARM 
 
The three subjects that I have discussed thus far—Josh’s definition of crime, 
his view of justification and excuse, and his view of criminal desert—share 
something in common: they are all inflected by Josh’s position on social harm.  
Thus, Josh defines crime to consist of acts or omissions that cause social harm; 
Josh argues that the punishment an actor deserves is a function of the harm he 
causes; and Josh’s preference for ex ante justification over ex post justification 
                                                                                                                                      
70  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (AM. LAW INS. 1985). 
71  Larceny, like attempt, is an inchoate crime because it does not depend upon deprivations of 
property being permanent.  See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 380. 
72  See PLATO, LAWS 9.876- .877b.  See also Peter Westen, Why Criminal Harms Matter: 
Plato’s Abiding Insight in the Laws, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 307 (2007). 
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may be a preference for the possible presence of social harm when justification is 
viewed ex ante over the absence of actual harm when justification is viewed ex 
post. 
These commonalities raise several questions: Is Josh’s notion of social harm 
merely a reformulation of John Stuart Mill’s venerable “Harm Principle”?  Or is 
Josh’s notion of social harm a watering down of Mill’s “Harm Principle”?  If it is 
the latter, what, if anything, would Josh lose by defining crime without reference to 
social harm? 
John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty that, in order to maximize personal 
freedom, the state ought to confine itself to preventing people from harming 
others.73  Mill’s disciple, Joel Feinberg, famously applied Mill’s harm principle to 
criminal law, arguing that, with some exceptions, the state ought not to punish 
persons unless they harm or immediately offend others.74  In both cases, the Harm 
Principle is a moral limitation on state regulation.  Its purpose is to restrain the 
state from regulating what the state might otherwise wish to regulate, by declaring 
it to be morally illegitimate for the state to punish persons for certain kinds of 
conduct that states may be tempted to punish, namely, self-regarding conduct and 
harmless conduct they may deem to be immoral. 
Josh devotes the first page of his treatise to defining crime, later stating it to 
be “essential” that crimes cause social harm.75  Moreover, in clarifying what he 
means by social harm, Josh quotes Joel Feinberg as saying that “[a]cts of harming . 
. . are the direct objects of the criminal law.”76  Josh’s reference to Feinberg might 
suggest that Josh means to adopt Mill’s and Feinberg’s moral limits on what the 
state may legitimately punish by incorporating those limits into his definition of 
crime.  If anything, however, the reality is the opposite.  With the exception of one 
behavior that, to my knowledge, no state punishes and neither Mill nor Feinberg 
even mentions, Josh imposes no moral limits on what states are tempted to punish 
through positive law. 
The key lies in Josh’s understanding of social harm.  Josh argues that, if social 
harm is to be an “essential element” (as he clearly means it to be), it must be 
“carefully—and broadly—defined.”77  To define social harm broadly, however, is 
the opposite of what Mill and Feinberg undertake because their purpose is the 
opposite of Josh’s.  Mill and Feinberg define harm narrowly because they want to 
constrain state authority in order to enlarge areas in which people may act free 
from criminal regulation.  Josh defines social harm broadly because, rather than 
constraining state authority, he wants to encompass state authority.  Josh is a 
treatise writer whose mission is to describe positive penal laws as they presently 
exist in the United States.  As such, Josh defines crime not to exclude such conduct 
                                                                                                                                      
73  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1859). 
74  See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984). 
75  See infra note 78. 
76  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 112 (quoting FEINBERG, supra note 74, at 31). 
77  Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
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as Mill and Feinberg argue ought not be punished but to incorporate whatever 
conduct states choose to punish through positive law.  Josh defines social harm to 
encompass “any . . . interest” that a society “deems socially valuable” and, hence, 
worthy of criminal protection: 
 
Society values and has an interest in protecting people and things.  The 
“things” that society values and has an interest in protecting may be 
tangible (e.g., an automobile or an animal) or intangible (e.g., emotional 
security, reputation, personal autonomy).  Society is wronged when an 
actor invades any socially recognized interest and diminishes its value.  
Specifically, “social harm” may be defined as the “negation, 
endangering, or destruction of an individual, group or state interest which 
was deemed socially valuable.”78 
 
Josh nevertheless recognizes an exception to this blanket incorporation.  Yet it 
is an exception for something that is so rarely, if ever, punished that it escapes 
Mill’s and Feinberg’s notice altogether—namely, the possession of mere thoughts.  
The sole moral constraint that Josh imposes on criminal law is that the state not 
punish persons for mere thoughts.79 
The result is that Josh could just as well define crime without any reference to 
the causing of social harm or injury.  Thus, consider Josh’s definition of crime: 
 
A crime [is an act or omission that] causes “social harm,” in that the 
injury suffered involves “a breach and violation of the public rights and 
duties” . . . “[that], if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal 
and solemn pronouncement of moral condemnation of the community.”80 
 
Apart from excluding punishment for mere thoughts, the reference to “caus[ing] 
social harm” does not add anything that does not exist without it.  It adds nothing 
because Josh defines “social harm” to encompass anything that society regards as 
violating “public rights or duties.”  Given that social harm plays no moral role 
except to bar punishing persons for mere thoughts, Josh could just as well define 
crime by omitting any reference to it, as follows: 
 
A crime is an act or omission [other than mere thoughts] that involves “a 
breach and violation of public rights and duties . . . [that], if duly shown 
to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of 
moral condemnation of the community.” 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Those of us who teach criminal law have at most 50 to 100 students per year.  
We like to believe that we leave our students with better understandings of 
criminal law than they would possess without us.  Yet, deep down, most of us 
realize that we are dispensable and that our students would do just fine with 
someone else in our place at the podium. 
The opposite is the case with the tens of thousands of students—including my 
own—who look each year to Joshua Dressler’s Understanding Criminal Law for 
instruction.  If it were not for Josh, they would struggle to make sense of the 
myriad puzzles and questions which U.S. casebooks foist on students of criminal 
law.  They would struggle because they would have nowhere else to turn for help.  
Wayne LaFave’s encyclopedic Criminal Law is no substitute because it is not 
tailored to the way criminal law is taught in U.S. schools.  And no other treatise 
comes close to Understanding Criminal Law in combining criminal law doctrine 
with the best of criminal law scholarship and in presenting it in a clear, succinct, 
and personal voice. 
Josh is not only America’s preeminent criminal law teacher.  He has made 
himself America’s indispensable criminal law teacher. 
